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ABSTRACT
Weexamine the potential for reducing cigarette, smoking through in-
creases incigarette excise taxes by estimating the price elasticity of demand
for cigarettes. Using information on individual smoking behavior for a sample
of adults in the 1976 Health Interview Survey, we estimate the adult price
elasticity of demand for cigarettes to be -.45.Moreover, we find that price
has its greatest effect on the smoking behavior of young males and that it
operates primarily on the decision to begin smoking regularly rather than
via adjustments in the quantity of cigarettes smoked by smokers. It follows
that, if future reductions in cigarette smoking are desired, Federal excise
tax policy can be a potent tool to accomplish this goal, but only in the
long run. An exèise tax increase, if'maintatned tn rea' terms, woUld
discourage smokingparticipation by successive cohorts of young adults
and those reduced smoking levels would be reflected in aggregate smoking as
these cohorts mature. In the short run however, the impact of an excise tax
increase on aggregate cigarette consumption would be relatively small.
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1.Introduction
In the last decade, soaring health care expenditures in the U.S.
have been associated with only small improvements in health levels. As a
result, many health care observers have concluded that the primary potential
for improving health and moderating the growth in health care costs lies in
preventive medicine and in encouraing individuals to alterunhealthy behaviors
(Fuchs, 1974; Look, Moore and Zeckhauser, 1981).
Cigarette smoking, regarded
for over 25 years as a significant contributor topoor health, is perhaps the
best èxàmole of an unhealthy behavior leading to substantial healthcare costs.
The direct(health-care)and indirect costs of smoking were estimated to have
been nearly $30 billion in 1976 (Luce and Schweitzer, 1977).
Public and private sector initiatives to discourage smoking have
included the dissemination of information from the 1964 Surgeon General 's
Report on smoking and health, anti—smoking television advertising tied to
cigarette conuiercials (the Fairness Doctrine), a ban on all cigarette ad-
vertising on radio and television, and the labelling of cigarettes with
warning messages. Warner (1977) presents evidence that these policies may
have had a substantial effect on smoking and estimates that 1975 per capita
cigarette consumption would have been 20 to 30 percent higher in the absence
1
of these anti—smoking policies. On the other hand, cigarette consumption
per capita,while currently about 10% below the peak established in 1963, has
not declined appreciably in the past decade(U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1981).
IThe effects of these policies are also discussed in Hamilton (1972); Ippolito,
Murphy and Sant (1979); Klein1 Murphy and Schneider (1981); Lewit, Coate and
Grossman (l98l);and Warner (1981). Not all of these studies agree on the
relative importance of different government policies on smoking behavior.2.
In this paper, we examine the potential for reducing cigarette
smoking through increases in excise taxes, a public policy that could lead
to permanent reductions in smoking. During the past three decades, the
federal excise tax has not been used as a policy tool to discourage smoking
despite the large and growing federal share of health care expenditures and
the large number of studies linking cigarette smoking and poor health.2 In
fact, the federal policy of holding the excise tax constant at eight cents per pack
since 1952 translates into a substantial reduction in the tax in real terms.
There is evidence, however, that state and local governments have used their
cigarette excise taxes to discourage smoking. The considerable anti—smoking
publicity associated with the Surgeon General's Report in 1964 was followed
by 23 state and local tax increases compared with no more than a dozen in any
of the preceding 14 years (Warner, 1977). State and local taxes have continued
to increase over time in many states; however, the ability of state and local
governments to raise their own cigarette taxes is limited because of the presence,
of cigarette bootlegging from low to high tax areas (Intergovernmental Perspective,
l978).
2There have been several attempts to increase the federal excise tax in recent
years because of concern over the health effects of cigarette smoking (Miller,
1976).
3me economies of several states depenl importantly nn.the qrowinq of totacco
and the production of cigarettes. At the state level, thee states maintain
very low excise taxes. At the federal level, the economic interests of
these states and the tobacco industry have apparently succeeded in blocking
any increases in the federal tax since 1952, despitethe Surgeon lènerals
Report in 1964 and the anti-smoking campaign waged by governmentand voluntary
groups since then.3.
2. Previous Estimates of the Price Elasticity ofDemand for Cigarettes
The impact of excise tax changes on cigarette demanddepends on
the extent to which changes in excise taxesare reflected in cigarette
prices4 and on the responsiveness ofcigarette demand to price. The litera-
ture shows a broad range of cigarette priceelasticity estimates. Studies
completed since 1970 using U.S. data have yielded estimatesranging from -.4
to —1.3 (Miller (1970); Mann (1971); Padillo (1971);Naniltbn (1972);
Schrabel (1972); Kellner (1973); Miller (1974);Fujii (1980); Klein, Murphy
and Schneider (1981)), These estimated elasticitiesare generally high enough
to suggest that excise taxes rates can have a substantialimpact on cigarette
consumption. For example, Warner (1977) borrows from thesefindings to attri-
bute a substantial portion of the decline incigarette consumption which took
place between 1963 and 1972 to the significant increase incigarette prices
during the period. There is reason to believe, however, that suchconclusions
may not be reliable guides for policy makers with an interest inreducing health
care costs through excise tax induced reductions in cigarettesmoking. This
is true for two reasons: 1) the crosssecti6nefJ teàrebiased upwards
because cigarette consumption is inaccuratelymeasured; and 2) the time series
estimates are not stable because of the high correlationbetween cigarette
price, income, and trend variables, and furthermore, reflect a short run
response to changes in price rather than the long run or permanentresponse
which is of interest to policy makers.
41f cigarette supply isperfectly elastic,excise tax changes will be fully
reflected in cigarette prices. This wouldappear to be a reasonable approxi-
mation for most modest tax changes.In fact, Barzel (1976) presents evidence
that cigarette prices have risen by more than theamount of state unit tax increases.4.
Cross section studies are generally relied on to provide price
elasticity estimates because multicollinearity among the independent varia-
bles is usually less of a problem than in time series estimation and because
the estimates are considered in most cases to represent the longrun or
complete response of quantity demanded to changes in price. Cross section
studies of cigarette demand, however, have generally provided elasticity
estimates that are biased upward in absolute value because the unit of obser-
vation has been the state and the dependent variable has been tax-paidcigarette
sales per capita. For many states, tax-paid sales do not reflect actualcon-
sumption. This disparity results from the fact that excise taxesvary sub-
stantially between states while state cigarette markets are not completely dis-
tinct or separable. Therefore, smuggling or bootlegging ofcigarettes froni low
tax to high tax states occurs and as a result, tax—paid salesare a biased
measure of consumption. Using sales data causes the elasticity of demand to
be bias?d because in high tax (price) states own consumption is under-
estimated by sales and in low tax (price) states own consumption is overesti-
mated. Thus, the response of cigarette demand to price isexaggerated.
In this paper, we more accurately measure the price elasticity of
demand for cigarettes than has heretofore beenpossible by using information
on the actual amount of cigarettes smoked by individuals who face different
cigarette prices. The data set we employ is therecently released 1976
Health Interview Survey (HIS), which contains informationon the smoking
behavior of a large sample of individuals in different tax (price)locations.3.
ifladdition, the data contains information on anarrayofindividual
and household characteristics sufficient to allow for the estimation of a
well specified demand relationship.
3. Specification of the Detand for Ciqarettes Ecuation
In specifying thedenand function that we estimate in this paper,
we assume that the demand fr cigarettes is a linear function of price, income
and taste variables where health and other considerations can enter the rela—
tior.ship via the taste component. Specifically, the ñnictfon is
=a÷ b P +cX
+dR + (1)
The dependent variable in the equation car1tither be the amount smoked by the
th individual in the 5th localityor a dichotomous variable indicating whe-
ther the individual is a smoker. The independent variables include the
average" price (Ps) of cigarettes in the th locality; a vector (X1) of
individual and household characteristics including family income, family size,
education, age, sex, marital status, health status, and race; a vector (Ri)
of region and city size characteristics; and a random disturbance team
Scrne of the vcriabies are measures of an individual's command over re-
sources and others are proxies for "taste' variables. Almost all of them
have been shown in previous studies to be related to differences in the pro-
pensity to smoke cigarettes (National Clearing House for Smoking and Health,
1976). The region of residence and size of place of residence variables are
included to partially control for cross—sectional differences in the cost of
living which are not otherwise reflected in our price or income measures.6.
We estimate the damand for cigarettes equation over allindividuals
(smokersand non—srokers) as well as over smokers only. implicit in our single
equation approach is the assumption that variation in the supply curves across
sample locations due to differences in excise tax rates identifies the demand
curves we specify.
Average Cigarette Prices
Differences in state and local cigarette tax rates in the U.S. cite
substantial and account for almost all the variation in the market price of
cigarettes. In 1976, state taxes equalled 24% of the retail price of ciga1
rettes on average and varied from 6% in North Carolina to 43% in Massachusetts.
Because of the state tax differences, the "average" price of cigarettes in
1976 was 57.3t a pack in Massachusetts and 36.6c a pack in North Carolina.
In addition, local taxes can substantially increase cigarette prices in certain
markets. The most notable of these in 1975 were in New York City (8 per pack-
age) and in Chicago (St per package).
Information on retail cigarette prices, excise tax rates, sales taxes
and a composite cigarette price is available from the Tobacco TarCoUnëiT
(1980). The Council calculates an 'average' retail price per state by taking
a weighted average of reported retail prices plus applicable sales--taxesof:
cigarettes sold by carton lot,by the single pack over-the—counter,and by the
single pack through vending machines. The weights are the national proportions
of cigarettes sold in these ways.5 This composite retail price is the basis
51n all states, the unit price of cigarettes is lowest when they are purchased
in carton lots while substantial mark ups are associated with purchasing ciga-
rettes by the single pack.In 1976, 56% of all cigarettes were purchased in
carton lots while 29% of sales were of over-the-counter single packs and 15%
single packs in vending machines. Because the price of cigarettes within a
locality may vary according to the way in which they are purchased, the use
in a demand equation of the weighted average price variable as a measure of
the price faced by actual and potential smokers is preferred to using the price
actually paid by smokers. This is because heavier smokers have a greater in-
centive to purchase cigarettes cheaply. To the extent that they economize on the
purchase price of cigarettes, the price paid is a function of the quantity
demanded and the coefficient of an actual price paid variable in a demand
equation would be biased due to the reverse causality.7.
for the price measure used in this study. In order to determine the prevailing
cigarette price for each observation in the HIS, we located each of the 430
Primary Sampling Units (PSU's) in the HIS on a map.The composite
cigarette price for each state was assigned to each PSU depending on state
of location. If there was any local cigarette tax applicable to the site,
the local tax rate was added to the composite retail price. When there was
more than one price attributable to a particular PSU, prevailing price was
determined by using population weights of the various geographic components
within the PSU to calculate an average composite price for the PSU.
Cigarette Price Differentials and Bootlegging
Because of differences in state and local excise taxes on cigarettes,
substantial price differentials exist across geographic boundaries. Since
cigarettes are relatively easy to transport across these boundaries, they are not
infrequently purchased in low tax areas for resale or personal consumption in
high tax areas. This bootlegging activity falls into three categories: 1) large
scale smuggling of truckloads of cigarettes from low tax areas for distribution
through regular retail/wholesale channels in high tax areas; 2) minor smuggling
from low tax areas for resale to friends and acquaintances at a profit but at
less than full retail price in higher tax areas; and 3) the crossing of tax
boundaries by individual consumers to purchase cigarettes at lower prices for
personal consumption.
Large scale smuggling for resale has become an important law en—
forcement and tax collection problem in certain high tax states. There Is
reason to believe that many cigarettes processed in this manner are sold
through regular distribution channels at prices approximating the fully taxed8.
retail level (Advisory Commission onIntergovernmna Re'ations, 1977).
This is because large scale
snuggling requires distribution through a large
network of retail dealers and the sale ofthese cigarettes at substantial
discounts from fully taxed retail price wouldgreatly facilitate their
detection by law enforcement officials.6To the extent that cigarettes smuggled
on a large scale are sold at fully taxed retailprices, individuals in
a PSU where large scale smuggling existscan still be assumed to pay
the prevailing retail price forcigarette as reported by the Tobacco Tax
Council (1980). Accordingly, large scalesmuggling should not bias estimates
of the price elasticity of demand forcigarettes obtained from our methodology.
Little information exists on theprevalence of or the prices charged
by small scale cigarette smugglers.Because, for the majority of smokers,
the transactions costs associated withrelying on small scale smugglers are
likely to be high, it is unlikely that thepresence of small scale smuggling
substantially biases our estimates of theaverage price of cigarettes.
A potential problem arises, however, in thecase of individuals
who reside in areas bordered by lowerprice (tax) areas. In these cases,
smokers and would-be smokers have theopportunity to purchase cigarettes
at less than the own area retail price
61n addition, anecdotalevidence suggests that large scalesmuggling has become
dominated by "organized crime". This would tendto discourage the price com-
petition among suppliers of bootlegged cigarettesnecessary to cause a decline
in the price of smuggled cigarettes.(Advisory Corrmiission on Intergovernmental
Relations, 1977).9.
if they are willing to travel for that purpose or, perhaps more importantly,
if they travel into the lower price areas for other reasons. There is
evidence that the purchase of cigarettes in lower price adjacent areas is
not unconinon.7 For example, in 1978 per capita tax paid cigarette sales
were 50% lower in New York City which imposed a local 8 per pack cigarette
tax than in the rest bf New York State. In fact, per capita cigarette sales
in New York State outside New York City were above the national average despite
the fact that state ckgarette taxes and hence retail prices were also above
the national average. Similarly, annual tax paid cigarette sales in New
Hampshire were 278.8 packs per capita in 1977 while in neighboring Massachu—
setts the comparable figure was 118.9. State cigarette taxes were 9 a pack
higher in Massachusetts than in New Hampshire in that year. If we assume
that the cigarettes purchased in New Hampshire beyohd the national average
of 133.6 packs per capita were consumed in Massachusetts, per capita "consump-
tion" in Massachusetts would rise to 139 or approximately to the national
average. This would imply that as much as 15% of the cigarettes smoked in
Massachusetts might have been purchased in New Hampshire. Although large
scale smuggling may account for a substantial portion of these tax paid
7Clearly, for any individual, the tendency to purchase cigarettes at the lower
price depends on the size of the price differential and the transactions costs
associat'ed with purchasing cigarettes in the adjacent area. As transactions
-costs decline, a smaller price differential will be required to induce pur-
chases in the adjacent market. Within a given market, transactions costs for
individuals who live near or coninute to a lower price area may be small or
non-existent. For other individuals within the same general geographic area,
such as those who live some distance from the boundary, transactions costs
may be sufficiently high so that only a very substantial price differential
would induce them to purchase cigarettes in the adjacent area.10.
sales differentials, the substantial amount of across boundary comuting for
work and recreation in these areas affords ample opportunity for the "incidental"
purchase of cigarettes in adjacent low price areas by many residents of high
price areas.
Generally then, the "average" price of cigarettes reported by the
Tobacco Tax Council will overstate the actual cigarette prices faced by 1indivi—
duals in high price areas which border lower price areas. Border price dif-
ferentials are relatively corrinon in the United States. In these cases, the use
of this "average" price variable can lead to biased estimates of the price elas-
ticity of demand for cigarettes. To correct for this problem, a procedure was
developed to identify and eliminate from our sample observations in PSU's where
because of the possible existence of "incidental" bootlegging average prices
reported might not accurately reflect prices faced by consumers. A 20 mile
wide band was drawn completely around each PSU and the prevailing retail price
of cigarettes within this band determined for each PSU.8 A "restricted" sample
of the HIS data set was then obtained by deleting from the full sample indi-
viduals in PSU's where the own average price was greater than the price within
the 20 mile band. This restricted sample should then consist almost solely of
8As noted previously, the purchase of cigarettes in adjacent areas at lower
prices is largely a function of travel costs. Twenty miles was arbitrarily
chosen as the distance beyond which price differentials would not substantially
affect cigarette purchases for own consumption.11.
individuals who face cigarette prices equal to those of their own state and
accurately represented by the Tobacco Tax Council price series. in this
paper, demand estimates are presented for the full HIS sample and the re-
stricted sample.
4. Data
The 1976 Health Interview Survey (HIS) was a nationwide
survey whit'n collected data weekly by household interview for the purpose of
determining the health status of the U.S. civilian noninstitutionalized popu-
lation. The 1976 HIS sample is comprised of 28,033 individuals between the
ages of 20 and 74 from 430 survey sites (PSU's) nationwide. The survey population
is representative of the population of the United States. All the variables
included in the analysis, with the exception of cigarette prices, •are reported
on the public use data tapes purchased from the National Center for Health
Statistics (NCHS). Average cigarette prices were calculated for each PSU
in the HIS based on data from th Tobacco Tax Council (1980) and placed on
the data tape under an arrangement with NCHS which preserved the confident-
iality of the respondents in the Survey. After editing, the data setcontained 19,266 observations with information on the smoking behavior of
individuals 20-74 years of age.9
5. Results
Definitions, means, and standard deviations of the three dependent
variables and the independent variables are presented in Table The surrniary
statistics are presented for the entire HIS sample and for the restricted
sample. Inspection of the sample means reveals that the two samples are not
substantially different. Not unexpectedly, the mean price in the restricted
sample is lower than the mean price in the entire sample and by extension the
mean price in the excluded PSU's. There are, however, a substantial number of
observations from high priced PSLVs in the restricted sample and the range of
cigarette prices for the restricted sample (35.3 to 57.6 per pack) is nearly
as large as the range (35.St to 62.U per pack) for the entire sample.
The most substantial difference between the two samples is in their
geographic representation of the nation. The restricted sample contains pro-
portionately more observations from the West (29%) than the total sample (18%)
and fewer observations from the Northeast (11% in the restricted sample vs. 24%
in the total sample). This is largely because the Northeast contains many
9Editing consisted primarily of eliminating observations for which little
information on smoking behavior was available. In addition1 the 1976 HIS
included a small number of observations in PSU's that NCHS could not identify.
Since we could not calculate appropriate average prices for these observa-





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































small political divisions with varying tax rates while the West isdominated
by larger geographic areas with more uniform tax rates. Representation of the
other regions is approximately equal in bothsamples.
OLS regression estimates of the demand for cigarettes(quantity
smoked by smokers and non—smokers)
,thesmoking participation rate and the
quantity smoked by smokers for both the total and the restrictedsample are
presented in Table 2. There are substantial differences in the estimatedprice
effects in the two samples —theprice coefficients and corresponding elasti-
cities at the mean are almost twice as large in therestricted sample as in the
total sample. Moreover, the price coefficient only achieves statistical
significance at the 5 percent level of a one—tailed test in thequantity smoked
regression for the total sample (column (a)) while it ismore robust in both
the quantity smoked and smoking participation rateregressions (columns (b) and
(d)) in the restricted sample.
The estimated coefficients of the other independent variablesare
generally not sensitive to the sample chosen)° Thesefindings are consistent
with measurement error in the full sample price variablewhich biases the full
sample price coefficient toward zero. The exclusion of a disproportionate
10Except for income, we do not discuss in thispaper the effects of the other



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































number of observations from the Northeast from the restricted sample adds
additional support to this hypothesis. In particular, Connecticut, Massa-
chusetts, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania have all been identified
as states with serious cigarette smuggling problems (Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, 1977).It is estimated that as many as one out
of each two packs of cigarettes sold in New York City are bootlegged
(Advisory Connission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1977). Because of the
apparent measurement error bias in the full sample results, we will rely on
price effects estimated from the restricted sample in the remainder of this
paper.
Regression estimates over the restricted sample for smoking parti-
cipation, and quantity smoked by smokers are presented in columns Cd) and
(f) of Table 2. The results suggest that an increase in the price of ciga-
rettes would reduce cigarette consumption primarily through reductions in
the smoking participation rate (price elasticity =-.26),while having a
much smaller impact on the quantity of cigarettes demanded by smokers (price
elasticity =_.1O).h1Because quantity smoked by smokers is not_very sensitive
'1These elasticities are computed at the means and the price coefficient in
the quantity of cigarettes demanded by smokers regression is not statistically
significant at conventional levels.23.
to price, higher cigarette prices would appear to effect cigarette demand by
affecting the decision to smoke or not rather than by causing existing smokers
to reduce the amount of cigarettes they smoke. This distinction i deve-
loped more fully in the next section. The combined or total price elasticity
of -.42 is at the low end of the range of recent estimates. This is not sur-
prising given the reliance on tax paid sales as the quantity measure in previous
cross section studies.12
The income elasticity of .08 is also small relative to previous
estimates. This point is taken up in the concluding section of the paper.
In contrast to price, income appears to impact cigarette demand primarily by
influencing the number of cigarettes consumed by smokers rather than by affect-
ing the smoking particpation rate.'3
Cigarette Demand by Different Age Groups
Because price appears to impact cigarette demand primarily through
its affect on the decision to smoke or not, demand equations were estimated
across the following age groups in the restricted saniple2o-25 years, 26-35
years, and over 35 years. The price coefficients and elasticities at the means
from these estimated demand equations are presented in Table 3. These
12Actually,the bias away from zero in the price elasticity estimates of these
previous studies is offset to some extent by the bias toward zero resulting
from the failure to take account of the lower prices in adjacent jurisdictions
faced by many smokers. However, the sale of cigarettes smuggled on a large
scale at the legal price level suggests that the foniier effect dominates the latter.
As further evidence of this upward bias, we estimated a demand for cigarettes
equation across states using 1976 state taxable sales as the dependent variable
and a number of state specific variables including per capita income and corn—
posite price as independent variables. The estimated price and income coeffi-
cients were both statistically significant at conventional levels and the esti-
mated elasticities at the means of 0.77 for income and -1.70 for price were both
substantially greater than our estimates of these parameters using the HIS data.
t3Ihe income elasticity of thesmoking participation rate at the means is .03 and
the income elasticity of the quantity smoked by smokers is .06.Regression Price Coefficients and Elasticities. eans_and









1. Demand for Cigarettes by Smokers and Nonsmokers (CIGDAY) (OLS)
PRICE
Elasticity













Sample Size 586 1,109 2,331
Table 3
According to Age and Smoking Statusa
24.
.091
















3. Demand forCigarettesby Smokers (CIGSMOKE)(OLS)
.067
- .04 — .15Table 3 Continued
20—25 Yr. 26-35 Yr. Over 35 25.
Olds Old& Yrs. Old
B. Means and Standard Deviations ofPrice and
Dependent Variablesu
CIGDAY 6.74 8.25 7.01
(10.60) (11 .93) (12.17)
SMOKER .39 .43 .33
(.49) (.50) (.47)
PRICE 47.78 47.77 48.11
(5.14) (5.17) (5.23)
CIGSMOKER 17.15 19.29 20.95
(10.37) (10.94) (12.28)
PRICE(CIGSMOKER)e 47.44 47.54 47.97
(5.37) (5.41) (5.43)
a) Standard errors of regression coefficientsare in parentheses below coefficients.
b) ay/ax's evaluated at the mean of SMOKERare reported in bracketsa1ongsd
coefficients.
c) The 0 statistic, which varies between 0 and 1, measures the goodness of fit of
the model. It is the value such that D(n-p)/(1—D)=modelchi—square, where p=
the number of variables in the model and n= the number ofobservations.
d) Standard deviations reported below means in parentheses.
e) Mean of PRICEinthe smokers only sample.
*Statisticallysignificant at 5% on two tail test
**Statisticallysignificant at 1% on two tail test26.
estimates are from regressions which included all the independent variables
included in the regressions in Table 2. While we do not present or discuss
the effects of these other independent variables on smoking, it should be
realized that a11 the estimated price effects presented in this paper control
for the effects of these other variables. The estimated price effects from the
smoking participation regression are estimated by a FIML logit procedure, the
preferred estimation procedure when the dependent variable is dichotomous
(INerlove and Press, l973).'
Since most regular smokers begin smoking before age 25(NatiOflal Clearing
House for Smoking & Health,1976) and since smoking is in some sense "addictive"
(Krasnegor.1976a), our previous results suggest that the smoking participation de-
cision of the younger age group may account for much of the aggregate price effects
found across all age groups. To a great extent, the results sumarized in Table 3
bear this out. The cigarette demand equations for smokers and non-smokers yieldeca
price elasticity of —.89 for the 20-25 years age group, a figure twice as large in
absolute value as the price elasticity for the other age groups. Furthermore, the
smoking participation price elasticity of -.74 for the 20—25 year olds accounts
for a great portion of the aggregate price elasticity of this age group. This
'4Fhe sinking participation rate equations were estimated by both OLS and FIML
logit procedures for all the age and sex subsamples of the restricted sample
rerorted in Tables 3,4 and 5.In all cases, the price effects obtained from
the OLS regressions were almost identical to those obtained when the FIML logit
procedure was used. We present the results of the logit estimates because
they are preferred on theoretical grounds. The entire HIS sample and the entire
"restricted" sample were too large to be accommodated by our logit program.
Those results, reported In Table 2, were obtained by OLS regression. Given
the size of the sample in each of these two instances and the similarity between
the OLS and logit estimates in the subsample estimates, we feel confident that
the OLS estimates presented in Table 2 are nearly identical to what logit
estimates would be.27.
is not to say that the results for the olderage groups do not show some
price sensitivity. The price coefficient is statisticallysignificant in
the demand for cigarette equations for theover 35 year old group and nearly
significant for those 26-35 years old. The price elasticity of demand at the
means for both these groups of about —.45 is not insubstantial.In the case
of the 26—35 year olds, priceappears to operate primarily through smoking
participation while the decomposition of the aggregate price effectfor the
older age group is less conclusive.
The results reported here that price has its greatest effect on
the smoking behavior of younger people and that it operatesprimarily via the
decision to begin smoking regularly rather than on the quantity smoked is consistent
with results reported by Lewit, Coate, and Grossman (1981). Lewit, Coate
and Grossman (1981) used another large micro-sample, the Health Examination
.Survey, 1966—1970, and a methodology similar to that described in thispaper
to examine cigarette demand by 12-17year olds. They report a total price
elasticity for the quantity smoked by teenage smokers and non-smokers of -1.4
and a smoking participation elasticity of —1.2. Thus, thepattern of larger
price elasticities in the younger age groups and the attribution of price effects
primarily to the smoking participation decision is confirmed in anothersample.
Cigarette Demand by Age and Sex
Further insight into the effects of price on cigarette demandcan
be gained by looking in some detail at the price elasticities ofdifferent
age and sex groups.
-Inprevious specifications, sex differentials in ciga-
rette demand were represented by a dummy variable, Theprice elasticity28.
results presented in Table 4 for males and Table 5 for females are based on
separate regressions for each sex in each age group. Thus, price effects
can now differ by sex as well as by age.
The results indicate that cigarette demand by females is generally
not sensitive totprice (Table s) while males (Table 4) appear more sensitive
to price than was implied by previous results where male and female price
effects were contrained to be equal. For 20-25 year olds, for example, the
price elasticity for quantity smoked by smokers and non-smokers was -.89 for
both sexes combined, -1.40 for males, and small and not significantly different
from zero for females.
Even for males, however, the effect of price on smoking behavior
varies with age. The coefficient of price in the regression for men aged
26—35 years fails to achieve statistical significance and price elasticities
at the mean are much smaller than for the younger group. Price does, however,
seem to act to reduce smoking by males more than 35 years old (Table 4).
Here the impact qf a price is split between changes in the smoking
participation rate and changes in the quantity smoked by smokers.It appears,
therefore, that to some extent price (tax) increases may have a beneficial
effect on the health of older males, a group that has experienced the greatest
health losses due to cigarette smoking(u,S, Public Health Service, 1979).
6. Implications of the Research
In this paper, we have attempted to assess the potential for using
excise taxes to reduce smoking by measuring the price elasticity of demand
for cigarettes. Excise tax increases will discourage smoking to the extentTable 4
29
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20—25 Yr. 26—35 Yr. Over 35
Olds aids Yrs. Old
8. Means and Standard Deviations of Price and Dependent
Variablesd
CIGDAY 8.06 9.85 9.06
(11.33) (12.59) (14.04)
SMOKER .45 .49 .39
(.50) (.50) (.49)
PRICE 47.84 47.69 48.05
(5.14) (5.13) (5.25)
CIGSMOKER 17.98 19.92 23.39
(10.38) (10.95) (13.19)
PRICE (CIGSF40KER)e 47.22 47.39 47.78
(5.54) (5.41) (5.50)
a) Standard errors of regression coefficients are in parentheses below coefficients.
b) evaluated at the mean of SMOKER are reported in bracketst. 2alongside
coefficients
c) -TheD statistic, which varies between 0 and 1, measures the goodness of fit of
the model. It is the value such that P (n-p)/(l-D)=rnodel chi—square, wherep=
the number of variables in the model and n=the number ofobservations.
d) Standard deviations reported below means in parentheses.
e) Mean of PRICE in the smokers only sample.
*Statisticallysignificant at 5% on two tail test
**Statisticallysignificant at 1% on two tail testTable 5
cticitiec .,
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20—25 Yr. 26—35 Yr. Over 35
Olds Olds Yrs. Old
B. Means and Standard Deviations of Price and Dependent
Variablesd








CIGSMOKER 16.32 18.56 18.23
(10.31) (10.88) (10.55)
PRICE(CIGSMOKER)e 47.65 47.71 48.1B
(5.20) (5.41) (5.35)
a) Standard errors of regresstion coefficients are in parentheses below coefficients
b)1y/x's evaluated at the means of SMOKER are reported in bracketsa1ongside
coefficients.
c)The D statistic, which varies between 0 and 1, measures the goodness of fit of
the model. It is the value such that D (n—p)/(1—D)=model chi-square, where p
the number of variables in the model and n= the number of observations.
d)Standard deviations reported below means in parentheses.
e) Meanof PRICE in the smokers only sample.
*Statistically significant at 5% on two tail test
** Statistically significant at 1% on two tail test33.
that excise tax increases are passed on to smokers in the form. ofhigher
retail cigarette prices. Barzel (1976) has presentedevidence that
retail cigarette prices have more than reflected state excise tax increases.
Our empirical results have indicated: 1) that the price elasticity
of demand for cigarettes is -.42;2) that price impacts cigarette demand
primarily by affecting the decision to begin smoking regularly among members
of the population less than 25 years; and 3) that price effects are much
larger for males than females —infact our estimates shw a price elasticity
near zero for females over 20 years old.
The results have implications for any future Federal government
attempts to influence cigarette demand through excise tax policy. The short
run impact of an excise tax Increase would be small. For example, if the
federal excHetax was doubled to 16 cents a pack,•ánd if the tax increase
was completely passed on to the consumer, then the average retail price
would increase by about 13% (using the average 1979average retail price as a
reference). Accordingly, applying our estimated price elasticity of -.42,
cigarette consumption would fall by about 5.5%. The fall-off in demand would
result from approximately a 3.9% decline in smoking participation and a 1.3%
decline in the quantity of cigarettes smoked by smokers. In the longrun,
however, the impact of such a tax increase would be much more substantial.
course, Increases in the retail price of cigarettes which result from
Increases In the costs of growing,inanufacturjng or marketingciUarettès
will discourage cigarette smoking to the same extent as tax Increases.34.
Our results imply that a doubling of the excise tax would lead to a 17%
decline in smoking participation by males 20—25. Furthermore, it may be
reasonable to expect that overtime the response by females to price changes
could approach that of males. Until the mid-1970's, trends in smoking par-
ticipation of males and females in the United States were markedly different.
Male smoking rates peaked in the mid—1960's at 51 percent of the male popu—
lation and have fallen continously since then, to 37 percent in 1979, the
latest year for which figures are available(U,S. Public Health Service, 1980)
Female smoking rates peaked later than male rates and were relatively constant
through 1976, the year in which the HIS data used in this study were collected,
More recent data, however, show a decline in female smoking, with participation rates
down to 28 percent from the 33 percent plateau of the late sixties to mid-seventies
(U.S. Public Health Service, 1980). At least to some extent then, one aspect of fe-
male smoking Isbecomingsimilar to that of males.16
In the long run, an excise tax increase, if maintained in real
tens, should continue to discourage smoking participation by successive genera-
tions of teenagers and young adults, while gradually impacting the smoking
levels of older age group as the smoking discouraged cohorts move through
the age spectrum. Moreover, since the discouraging effects of an excise
tax increase would operate largely through the participation
is beyond the scope of this paper to determine why price seems to affect male
smoking behavior but not female smoking behavior or to explain differences in
aggregate smoking behavior by the two sexEs. We would only point out
that since males and females face the same prices for cigarettes and since
the real price of cigarettes has fallen during the 1970's, the differential
behavior cited above cannot be attributed to the level of or to changes in
the price of cigarettes.25.
decision rather than through quantity adjustments by existing smokers, several
arguments that excise tax increases may not have beneficial health effects
loose force.In particular, some have argued that smokers respond to higher
prices by switching to higher tar and nicotine brands, by inhaling more deeply,
or by reducing idle burn.'7All of these compensatory behaviors by smokers
would greatly reduce any health benefits which might be obtained fromreducing
the number of cigarettes smoked because of higher taxes. These arguments,
however, are obviously not relevant to the smoking participation decision and
are inconsistent with our findings of small quantity adjustments by smokers.
Some final words are reserved for a discussion of income elasticity
of demand for cigarettes. The size of the income elasticity has had important
implications for evaluationsof federal government policies to discourage
smoking(Hamilton 1972; Ippolito, Murphy. and Sant, 1979; Klein, Murphy,
and Schneider, 1981). Our estimated income elasticity of demand, .08 (Table
2), is about one—tenth the size of the estimate obtained by Ippolito,
Murphy, and Sant (1979) from time series data and about one-tenth the size of
Hamilton's (1972) estimate which was obtained from a cross state analysis of
,tax paid sales data. As a result, the models of both Hamilton (1972) and
Ippolito, Murphy, and Sant (1979) tend to attribute more of the secular varia-
tion in per capita cigarette consumption to variations in income than would a
model incorporating our estimated income elasticity. For example, Hamilton
(1972) estimates that annual cigarette consumption would have increased from
3506 cigarettes per capita in 1953—55 to 4482 cigarettes per capita in 1968-70
due to the substantial increase in income during that period. Since consump-
tion only Increased to 3868 cigarettes per capita in 1968—70, he credits the
health scare and anti-smoking advertising under the Fairness Doctrine with
17For recent discussions ofthese compensatory behaviors seeKrasnegor (l979a and 1979b), and Gori and Bock (1980).36.
substantially reducing smoking below the level it otherwise wouldhavebeen.
To the extent to which Hamilton's estimate of an income induced increase in
smoking may have been too large, he may have overstated the impact of the
health scare. Moreover, his analysis of the differential effects of the Fair-
ness Doctrine and advertising bàn policies may also require reconsideration
if they too rely substantiall' on an overstated income effect. Of course,
it Is possible that the income elasticity of demand for cigarettes has
declined substantially in recnt years for many reasons including the health
scare and related government programs. In fact, Klein, Murphy, and Schneider
(1981) assess the impact of government cigarette policies within the context
of a time series model wherein the income elasticity of demand for cigarettes
falls as income rises. As a result, their estimated income elasticIty for
18
1976 is closer to our estimate than the estimates cited inviiediately above.
181ntheKlein, Murphy, and Schneider (1981) model, income can influence the
—--—detnand-forctgarettesin two—wftys÷——by--affecting the demand far tobacco and
byaffecting the proportion of tobacco consumed as cigarettes. They assume
that below a critical level of income ($551 1929 dollars) all tobacco is
consumed in forms other than prerolled cigarettes whereas above this level
Accordingly, as income ri.ses over
time the increase in cigarette demand that Is due to switching declines as
there are a declining number of non-cigarette smoking tobacco smokers who
can switch to cigarettes.In the limit, when all smokers smoke cigarettes
exclusively, they estimate the income elasticity of demand for cidarettes
(and all tobacco) to be .47.37.
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